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CORRIGENDUM TO “MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE PROBLEMS: A
DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE”
SANDER HEINSALU
Abstract. This paper corrects some mathematical errors in Holmstro¨m (1999) and clarifies the
assumptions that are sufficient for the results of Holmstro¨m (1999). The results remain qualitatively
the same.
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1. Introduction
This note corrects some mathematical errors in the career concerns model with normally dis-
tributed type and signal in Holmstro¨m (1999) Sections 2.1–2.3. The corrigendum is organized as
follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the additional assumptions on the cost function that
are sufficient for some of the results in Holmstro¨m (1999). Section 2.1 derives the equilibrium
strategy in detail, correcting some errors in the derivation of Holmstro¨m (1999). Section 2.2 first
corrects an inconsistency between Holmstro¨m (1999) Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Second, it introduces
an assumption necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium labor supply to converge to zero as the
type becomes persistent or the random component of the output large. Third, it discusses ways to
resolve the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the undiscounted case. Section 2.3 presents two ways
to modify the definitions in Holmstro¨m (1999) Section 2.3, both of which correct an error in the
proof of Proposition 2.
2. The model
The notation and the model follow Holmstro¨m (1999). The players are a manager and a com-
petitive market. Time is discrete, indexed by t ∈ N, and the horizon is infinite. The manager
initially has ability η1, which is symmetric incomplete information, and commonly believed to be
drawn from the prior probability distribution N(m1, 1/h1), where h1 ∈ (0,∞) is the precision (the
inverse of the variance). Ability evolves according to ηt+1 = ηt + δt, where δt ∼ N(0, 1/hδ) i.i.d.
over time. The basic model of Holmstro¨m (1999) assumes hδ = ∞, which is later relaxed. This
corrigendum treats the cases hδ =∞ and hδ ∈ (0,∞) together.
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Each period t, the manager chooses labor aˆt ∈ [0,∞], which generates public output yt =
ηt + aˆt + ǫt, where ǫt ∼ N(0, 1/hǫ) i.i.d. over time, hǫ ∈ (0,∞), and ǫt is independent of η1, δs for
any t, s.1 The competitive and risk-neutral market observes yt−1 = (y1, . . . , yt−1) ∈ R
t−1 at the
start of period t and pays the manager a wage wt(y
t−1) ∈ [−∞,∞] equal to the manager’s expected
output. The market’s wage rule w = (wt)
∞
t=1 is a sequence of functions wt : R
t−1 → [−∞,∞].
The manager’s cost of choosing labor aˆ is g(aˆ), with g continuously differentiable on R+, in-
creasing, convex, g′(0) = 0 and limaˆ→∞ g
′(aˆ) = ∞. Holmstro¨m (1999) only assumes that g is
increasing and convex. Sufficient for the maximizer of the manager’s utility function (1) to exist
is that g is continuous, because the action set [0,∞] is compact. For the first order approach used
in Holmstro¨m (1999) to be valid, a convex and continuously differentiable g is sufficient.
The manager’s public strategy a = (at)
∞
t=1 is a sequence of functions at : R
t−1 → [0,∞], where
at maps the output history y
t−1 to the action aˆt. Public strategies (even mixed) are w.l.o.g. when
the game has a product structure2, as shown in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) p. 330. The game
here has only one strategic player, so trivially a product structure. Hereafter, a public strategy is
simply called strategy.
The manager’s discount factor is β ∈ [0, 1). The undiscounted model with β = 1 is discussed at
the end of Section 2.2. The manager’s ex post utility is
U(w, a) =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1[wt − g(at)]. (1)
A perfect public equilibrium consists of the manager’s strategy a∗ and the market’s wage rule w
such that for all t and yt−1,
a∗t (y
t−1) ∈ argmax
aˆt
{
wt(y
t−1)− g(aˆt) +
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tE
[
wτ (y
τ−1)− g(a∗τ(y
τ−1))
∣∣yt−1]
}
, (2)
wt(y
t−1) = E
[
yt|y
t−1
]
= E
[
ηt|y
t−1
]
+ a∗t (y
t−1).
Hereafter, a pure perfect public equilibrium is simply called equilibrium. Restricting attention to
pure strategies is w.l.o.g., because g is convex and any E[yt+k|y
t−1] that the manager can generate
with mixed actions can be generated by pure actions.
2.1. Results for the basic model. The market is Bayesian and conjectures the manager’s strat-
egy a∗t (y
t−1), so de-biases the output yt to the signal zt := yt−a
∗
t (y
t−1), which in equilibrium equals
ηt + ǫt. From the manager’s perspective, zt = ηt + ǫt + aˆt − a
∗
t (y
t−1). The mean of the market’s
belief at the start of period t (after t−1 signals) is denoted mt and the precision ht. The precision
of the market’s belief after seeing yt but before taking into account the shock δt added to ηt is
1 The independence of ǫt, η1, δs for all t, s is implicit in Holmstro¨m (1999).
2A product structure means that the informativeness of the public signal about the actions of the other strategic
players is independent of a player’s own action.
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ht + hǫ.
3 Bayesian updating implies
ηt|z
t−1 ∼ N
(
mt,
1
ht
)
= N
(
ht−1mt−1 + hǫzt−1
ht−1 + hǫ
, 1
/
(ht−1 + hǫ)hδ
ht−1 + hǫ + hδ
)
. (3)
The market sets the wage wt(y
t−1) = mt(z
t−1) + a∗t (y
t−1), where zt = (z1, . . . , zt). The common
belief precision ht evolves deterministically, which is used to take it outside the expectations below.
The manager’s time-t expectation E [wτ (y
τ−1)|yt−1] of the future wage wτ , τ > t given y
t−1 and
aˆt is
E
[
wτ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
= E
[
hτ−1
hτ−2mτ−2+hǫzτ−2
hτ−2+hǫ
+ hǫzτ−1
hτ−1 + hǫ
∣∣∣∣∣yt−1
]
+ E
[
a∗τ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
= E
[
hτ−1hτ−2mτ−2 + hτ−1hǫzτ−2
(hτ−1 + hǫ)(hτ−2 + hǫ)
+
hǫzτ−1
hτ−1 + hǫ
∣∣∣∣yt−1
]
+ E
[
a∗τ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
= E
[
hτ−1hτ−2(hτ−3mτ−3 + hǫzτ−3)
(hτ−1 + hǫ)(hτ−2 + hǫ)(hτ−3 + hǫ)
+
hτ−1hǫzτ−2
(hτ−1 + hǫ)(hτ−2 + hǫ)
+
hǫzτ−1
hτ−1 + hǫ
+ a∗τ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
= mt
τ−1∏
i=t
hi
hi + hǫ
+
hǫ
hτ−1 + hǫ
τ−1∑
i=t
E
[
zi
∣∣yt−1] τ−2∏
j=i
hj+1
hj + hǫ
+ E
[
a∗τ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
, (4)
with the notational convention
∑t
s=t+1 xs = 0 and
∏t−1
j=t xs = 1 for any xs. The manager’s ex-
pectation of the time-t signal zt is E [ηt + ǫt + aˆt − a
∗
t (y
t−1)|yt−1] = mt + aˆt − a
∗
t (y
t−1). When
forming expectations about future signals zi, i > t, the manager expects her future selves to
follow the equilibrium strategy, therefore E [zi|y
t−1] = E [ηi + ǫi + a
∗
i (y
i−1)− a∗i (y
i−1)|yt−1] = mt.
Substituting the expected signals into (4) results in
E
[
wτ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
=mt
τ−1∏
j=t
hj
hj + hǫ
+
hǫ
hτ−1 + hǫ
[mt + aˆt − a
∗
t (y
t−1)]
τ−2∏
j=t
hj+1
hj + hǫ
(5)
+
hǫ
hτ−1 + hǫ
mt
τ−1∑
i=t+1
τ−2∏
j=i
hj+1
hj + hǫ
+ E
[
a∗τ (y
τ−1)|yt−1
]
.
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the manager’s objective function
mt + a
∗
t (y
t−1)− g(aˆt) +mt
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t
τ−1∏
j=t
hj
hj + hǫ
+ [aˆt − a
∗
t (y
t−1)]
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t
hǫ
hτ−1 + hǫ
τ−2∏
j=t
hj+1
hj + hǫ
+mt
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t
hǫ
hτ−1 + hǫ
τ−1∑
i=t
τ−2∏
j=i
hj+1
hj + hǫ
+
∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tE
[
a∗τ (y
τ−1)− g(a∗τ(y
τ−1))|yt−1
]
(6)
3 To derive ht+1, the market first updates ηt (which has precision ht) in response to the signal zt (precision hǫ),
obtaining precision ht + hǫ. Then the market adds the variance
1
hδ
of the normally distributed shock δt−1 to the
variance 1
ht−1+hǫ
of the normally distributed updated ηt−1. If hδ =∞, then ht + hǫ = ht+1 for all t.
Holmstro¨m (1999) defines hˆt := ht + hǫ, but interprets it on p. 173 as “the precision on ηt+1 before observing
yt+1” without clarifying that hˆt is the precision after observing yt and before adding the shock δt.
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and taking the first order condition (FOC) w.r.t. aˆt results in
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t
hǫ
hs−1 + hǫ
s−2∏
j=t
hj+1
hj + hǫ
− g′(aˆt) = 0. (7)
The manager’s marginal benefit of aˆt is the discounted sum of the responses of future wages to
aˆt. Because the wage is paid in advance, period-t effort does not affect the period-t wage. The
SOC holds, because g is convex. When hδ = ∞, the FOC in Holmstro¨m (1999) is Equation (10),
reproduced in (H10):
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
hǫ
hs
= g′(a∗t ). (H10)
It corresponds to the current paper’s FOC (7) with hδ = ∞, in which case hs−1 + hǫ = hs,
but Holmstro¨m erroneously starts the sum from index t, not t + 1. Holmstro¨m’s Equation (21),
reproduced below in (H21), corresponds to the current paper’s (7) for general hδ and starts the
sum correctly from t+ 1, but has a different error. Holmstro¨m (1999) defines µt :=
ht
ht+hǫ
, and his
FOC is
(1− µt)
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t
s∏
i=t+1
µi = g
′(a∗t ). (H21)
Taking hδ =∞ (so that hi+hǫ = hi+1), the LHS in (H21) becomes
hǫ
ht+hǫ
∑
∞
s=t+1 β
s−t
∏s
i=t+1
hi
hi+hǫ
=∑
∞
s=t+1 β
s−t hǫ
ht+1
∏s
i=t+1
hi
hi+1
=
∑
∞
s=t+1 β
s−t hǫ
hs+1
, which is inconsistent with (H10) where the sub-
script of hs+1 is s. To make (H21) consistent with (H10) when hδ =∞ and the sum in (H10) has
been corrected to start at t + 1, the product in (H21) should end at s − 1, not s. Thus (H21)
should be written
(1− µt)
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t
s−1∏
i=t+1
µi = g
′(a∗t ). (8)
The LHS of (8) is
∑
∞
s=t+1 β
s−t hǫ
ht+hǫ
∏s−1
i=t+1
hi
hi+hǫ
=
∑
∞
s=t+1 β
s−t hǫ
hs−1+hǫ
∏s−1
i=t+1
hi
hi−1+hǫ
, same as the
marginal benefit in (7). The intuition for the correct FOC is that increasing the manager’s labor
aˆt by one unit increases the market’s mean belief mt+1 next period by
hǫ
ht+hǫ
units, but given mt+1,
does not directly affect any mτ , τ 6= t + 1. For any n ∈ N, increasing mn by one unit raises mn+1
by hn
hn+hǫ
units, but does not directly affect any mτ , τ /∈ {n, n+ 1}. Therefore increasing aˆt by one
unit raises mt+k, k ≥ 1 by
hǫ
ht+hǫ
∏k−1
i=1
ht+i
ht+i+hǫ
units. The expected wage E[wt+k|y
t−1] increases one
for one with mt+k, because a
∗
n is independent of mℓ for any n, ℓ, thus there is no multiplier effect
from aˆt to mn+k via a
∗
n. A unit increase in wt+k is worth β
k at time t.
2.2. The stationary case. A stationary equilibrium requires hδ < ∞ and features a constant
belief precision ht+1 = ht =: h. In terms of µ :=
h
h+hǫ
, the steady state marginal benefit of the
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manager’s action (the LHS of (8)) is
(1− µ)
∞∑
s=1
βs
s−1∏
i=1
µ = (1− µ)
∞∑
s=1
βsµs−1 =
β(1− µ)
1− βµ
. (9)
This matches Holmstro¨m (1999) Equation (22), reproduced below in (H22), but is not derived
from (H21). The steady state version of (H21) is instead (1− µ)
∑
∞
s=1 β
s
∏s
i=1 µ =
βµ(1−µ)
1−βµ
, which
has different comparative statics from those in Holmstro¨m (1999) Proposition 1.
For the stationary labor supply a∗ to satisfy Holmstro¨m’s Equation (22)
β(1− µ)
1− βµ
= g′(a∗), (H22)
the assumptions g ∈ C1, g′(0) = 0 and limaˆ→∞ g
′(aˆ) > 1 are sufficient. Holmstro¨m (1999) p. 174
states that a∗ is close to zero when β < 1 and hδ is large relative to hǫ, which is true iff the
additional4 assumption that g′(a) = 0 ⇒ a = 0 holds. If this assumption is violated, i.e. if
g′(a) = 0 for all a ∈ [0, k] for some k > 0, then as the marginal benefit of labor (the LHS of (H22))
converges to zero, the manager’s labor supply a∗ converges to k, not zero.
Holmstro¨m (1999) p. 174 compares the manager’s labor supply under hδ =∞ and hδ <∞, both
when β < 1 and when β = 1. The comparison is indeterminate if β = 1, because in this case, one
of the summands in the manager’s utility (6) is infinite5, so the maximizer of (6) is undefined. If
hδ <∞ and limaˆ→∞ g
′(aˆ) =∞, then the FOC (8) still has a finite solution, which may be defined
as the manager’s choice of labor when (6) is infinite. In that case the rest of the analysis remains
valid.
If β = 1 and hδ =∞, then the marginal benefit of labor in the FOC (8) diverges, so the solution
of the FOC is a∗t = ∞. This infinite labor presents a problem for Bayesian updating and by
extension the derivation of the FOC itself. If the market expects a∗t (y
t−1) =∞, then any aˆt <∞
leads to yt < ∞, which is off the equilibrium path, so Bayes’ rule does not apply. One way to
resolve the updating problem is to use belief threats to deter the manager from deviating, e.g. set
mt+1 = −∞ after yt < ∞. If the manager chooses aˆt =∞, then the output is yt =∞ for any ηt,
thus uninformative about the type. By Bayes’ rule, the market’s mean belief is mt+1 = mt after
yt =∞.
2.3. Transient effects. On p. 174, Holmstro¨m (1999) defines bs(µ1) := (1− µ1)µ2 · · ·µs without
clarifying whether the µi, i > 1 are independent variables or the functions of µ1 recursively defined
in Holmstro¨m’s Equation (17):
µt+1 =
1
2 + hǫ/hδ − µt
. (H17)
4 Recall that Holmstro¨m (1999) only assumes that g is increasing and convex.
5 Proof:
hj+1
hj+hǫ
≥ min
{
ht+1
ht+hǫ
, h
h+hǫ
}
=: ι > 0 uniformly in j ≥ t, so
∑τ−1
i=t
∏τ−2
j=i
hj+1
hj+hǫ
≥ 1−ι
τ−t
1−ι
> 1 and∑
∞
τ=t+1
hǫ
hτ−1+hǫ
∑τ−1
i=t
∏τ−2
j=i
hj+1
hj+hǫ
=∞.
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This distinction becomes important in the equation
bs+1(µ1) =
1− µ1
1− µ2
µ2bs(µ2) =
1− µ1
1 + r − µ1
bs(µ2), (10)
which is unlabeled in Holmstro¨m (1999). If all µi are treated as independent variables, then
bs(µ2) = (1− µ2)µ2
∏s
i=3 µi, but if each µi is understood as a function of the argument of bs, then
bs(µ2) = (1 − µ2)
∏s
i=3 µi, because each µi is then obtained from µ2 by i − 2 iterations of (H17).
In either case, the first equality in (10) fails in general. If all µi are independent variables and
µ2 6= µs+1, then
bs+1(µ1) = (1− µ1)µs+1
s∏
i=2
µi 6=
1− µ1
1− µ2
µ2bs(µ2) = (1− µ1)µ
2
2
s∏
i=3
µi.
If each µi is treated as a function of the argument of bs, and µs+1 6= 1, then
(1− µ1)µs+1
s∏
i=2
µi 6=
1− µ1
1− µ2
µ2bs(µ2) = (1− µ1)
s∏
i=2
µi.
From now on, treat each µi as a function of the argument of bs. A modification to (10) that
makes the equalities in it hold is to replace bs with bs+1, obtaining bs+1(µ1) =
1−µ1
1−µ2
µ2bs+1(µ2) =
1−µ1
1+r−µ1
bs+1(µ2). Another way to make (10) valid is to define bs(µ2) as (1 − µ2)µ3 · · ·µs+1, which
suggests the general definition
bs(µt) := (1− µt)
t+s−1∏
i=t+1
µi for any s ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ s. (11)
Either way to make (10) hold ensures that the inductive proof on p. 174 of Holmstro¨m (1999) is
correct, i.e. that γ1 := (1−µ1)
∑
∞
s=2 β
s−1
∏s
i=2 µi (the LHS of (H21) at t = 1) decreases in µ1. The
same proof shows that the LHS of (8) at t = 1 decreases in µ1. Using (11) in (10) and replacing
µ1, µ2 with µt, µt+1 respectively shows that for any t, the LHS-s of (H21) and (8) decrease in µt.
This proves Proposition 2 in Holmstro¨m (1999).
If the definition of bs is not altered to (11), but remains bs(µt) = (1−µt)
∏s
i=t+1 µi, then to prove
that for any t, the LHS of (H21) decreases in µt, the equation (10) should be modified separately
for each t. Specifically, µ1 and µ2 should be replaced with µt and µt+1 respectively, and both bs+1
and bs should be replaced with bs+t.
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